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The ONE BELT ONE ROAD project of China
Intervention of Dr. Artur Victoria, Specialist on China’s OBR, Portugal, in the IAAP Session of the Think Tank 2022 Forum on 2 February, 2022.
In the Roman Empire, linking its regions was a project to sustain peace, develop its economy and offer welfare and cultural benefits to its citizens. Today, as I am talking about China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project, let me note some preliminary points. Any project of this magnitude depends on two main factors: (1) the reasons to carry out the project, (2) the will to realise the project. Moreover, any intervention in a project needs to be based on the indissoluble triangle, that is; (1) what to do, (2) how to do it, and (3) the means to do it. In a more theoretical approach, we need to analyse any intervention in a project with geopolitics (what to do), geostrategy (how to do it) and geopower (the means to do it).
According to the definition of Professor Beckhouser, geopolitics is the policy made as a result of geographic conditions. Professor Meira Mattos went further in working with this definition, saying that geopolitics is the policy applied to geographic spaces. So, we can conclude that geopolitics is the establishment of objectives over spaces, just as geostrategy is the strategy defined for achieving geopolitical objectives, and geopower is the application of power to achieve geopolitical goals.
There are some key elements in formulating geopolitics such as: (1) the domain of water basins, (2) exits to the sea, (3) the multiplication of maritime exits, (4) supply routes, (5) establishment of bases, (6) spatial distribution of power. With these theoretical considerations, let us examine China’s OBOR project.
Global merchandise traffic is done either by sea or land. Land traffic mainly uses railways and trucks. According to UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, around 80% of international trade in goods is transported by sea. These transported goods are received in harbours where, after customs inspection and paying tax duties, they are distributed by railways and vehicles.
Worldwide, there is still a small density of railways. As pointed out by the World Bank report, we can find a reasonable distribution by railways in the Euro-Asia zone, the Russian Federation, the southern region of the Black Sea, in North America and in South Africa.
Since 2013, China has been engaged in a project involving building worldwide railway and maritime networks, on the assumption that Asia will face an infrastructural funding gap of an estimated USD 26 trillion through 2030, as reported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Currently, various regional and sub-regional initiatives are aiming at developing better transport connectivity within Asia, including the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Connectivity Initiative, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) Cooperation Program, South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Program as well as OBOR.
Early this century, China started searching in several developed countries including Portugal for the best technologies for railway system control. For instance, EFACEC, a nationally referenced company, received a year's engineering contract for China to learn modern railway traffic control systems. Likewise, other big companies in France and Germany were contracted for such services in joint ventures to provide knowledge.
China has an excellent internal railway network running through 7,900 kilometres of lines crisscrossing the country, linking all of its mega-city clusters. Many of them have been built since 2008 and a half of that during the last five years. A further 3,700 kilometres of railway lines were due to open in 2021. The network will double in length to 70,000 kilometers by the year 2035. With a maximum speed of 350 kph, the driverless ‘bullet trains’ connecting Beijing and Zhangjiakou are the symbol of high technology and warranty for China’s domestic railway's future.
In the OBOR project, China has assumed the existence of six railway corridors: (1) the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, anticipating a Eurasian Union, (2) New Eurasian Land Bridge, linking the Pacific and the Atlantic, (3) China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, linking China and the Arabian Peninsula, (4) China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, extending from China's Pearl River Delta westward along the Nanchong-Guang'an Expressway and the Nanning-Guangzhou High-speed Railway via Nanning and Pingxiang to Hanoi and Singapore, (5) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, starting from China's Kashi and ending at Pakistan's Gwadar, (6) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, expected to boost the integrated development of the three economic plates of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia.
You can search many articles, reports, and opinions on these programs through internet search engines. I will give my own remarks rather than repeating facts that are easy to access.
I identify China’s assumptions for its OBOR project as follows: (1) trade and investment developments will be enhanced by infrastructure growth, (2) for a global country like China, people–to–people connections will facilitate its domestic as well as its international tourism, (3) coordinating the infrastructure connectivity will enhance unimpeded trade and financial integration among, for example, the China Development Bank, ASEAN Connectivity Initiative, CAREC Program, GMS Cooperation Program, SASEC Program as well as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The international community started talking about “possible threats” which this ‘New Silk Road’ could impose in the fields such as: (1) defence, financing, imports and customs, environmental issues, international relations, commerce and Industry in general, (2) the protection of borders, natural resources management, safety on the sea and land including piracy.
China’s diplomatic efforts began through conferences, in which its ambassador stressed peace as the project’s first outcome. I happened to attend most of the conferences held on the subject in my country. The other benefits emphasized include (1) policy coordination for achieving joint developments, (2) improved educational connectivity, (3) setting up of concrete cooperation mechanisms.
Other countries’ reactions may be of interest. For instance, an Indian representative noted some adverse reactions from implementing the project, as OBOR would fundamentally tilt Asia’s geopolitics in China's favour. Although India officially endorses all the connectivity initiatives, its representatives expressed cautionary remarks: China uses a mix of investment, debt, and bribery, referring to the cases of Sri Lanka, Laos and Cambodia; China benefits the Pakistan's economy by creating debts. India introduced two recently announced plans for an India-Japan-Africa Connectivity Corridor, both on land and maritime, with its first nodes in Kenya and Mozambique.
Between 2017 and 2019, more than a dozen Latin American countries and ten Caribbean nations joined OBOR. Many countries are still actively soliciting Chinese investments. Nearly all NATO member states in eastern and southern Europe have associated with OBOR.
Moreover, China’s ambitious plans would foresee: a Polar Silk Road to link China to the Arctic and the Antarctic; a Digital Silk Road with undersea cables, data centres and 5G-telecommunications systems; a Health Silk Road to promote Chinese COVID vaccines.
Looking toward China’s future, Dr. Danyang Xie, dean of Economics and Management School of the Wuhan University, assesses the following prospects: by 2025 – the RMB (China’s currency unit) to become one of the top 3 major currencies; by 2030 - World Knowledge Centre be set up, by 2040 – China’s GDP to reach $60 trillion (2000 PPP) or one fourth of the World’s GDP.
Analysing China’s progresses in the project, I can say that the project should be the prerequisite for a successful strategy of global economic and social cooperation. At least it enhances political awareness towards integration and exerts the will to do so around the world. It also stimulates cooperation in land and maritime domain intelligence and a cycle management.
I see the key elements for a successful OBOR Strategy as follows: (1) respect for national sovereignty, (2) bilateral or multilateral agreements in the economic and financial areas, (3) cooperation in education and religions, (4) integration, (5) information sharing on project progress and results, (6) environmental management, (7) cooperation in world peace, (8) capabilities and capacity building.
Let me conclude my talk with the following remarks: The OBOR project must be accompanied by profound political understanding, integration and the will to realize it among the nations concerned. It should also work in good collaboration with other international infrastructure programs such as the EU’s Global Gateway, the G-7 nations Build Back Better World (3BW), as well as the Global Peace Road advocated by this webinar’s organizer, the Universal Peace Federation (UPF). OBOR has to maintain its credibility and relevance. In promoting the spirit, ideology and policies of cooperation, we need to examine the advocacy of UPF in terms of Interdependence, Mutual Prosperity and Universal Values.
(cf) Suggested internet links
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- [China’s Neighbourhood Foreign Policy against the Backdrop of One Belt and One Road]”, Financial Times (Chinese edition), 11 January 2016, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001065641.
- China’s Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference, see Michael D Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on Peripheral Diplomacy”, China Leadership Monitor 44 (Summer 2014), http://www.hoover.org/research/chinese-views-and-commentary-periphery-diplomacy.
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- Douglas Paal, “Contradictions in China’s Foreign Policy”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 December 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/13/contradictions-in-china-s-foreign-policy-pub-53913 - comments.
- Dipankar Banerjee, “China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative — An Indian Perspective”, ISEAS Perspective, Issue 2016, No 14, 31 March 2016, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_14.pdf.
- Andrew Small, The China–Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (London: Hurst & Company, 2015), 103–105.
- Dave Boyer, “At White House, Leader of Singapore Urges Congress to Approve Free-trade Deal”, The Washington Times, 2 August 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/2/singapore-pm-urges-congress-ok-free-trade-deal/.
- Carrie Grace, “US Leaving TPP: A Great News Day for China”, BBC News, 22 November 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38060980.
- Ben Blanchard, “Duterte Aligns Philippines with China, Says US Has Lost”, Reuters, 20 October 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS.
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- Alok Ranjan, “The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: India’s Options”, Institute of Chinese Studies Occasional Paper No 10, May 2015, 12, http://www.icsin.org/uploads/2015/06/05/31e217cf46cab5bd9f15930569843895.pdf.
- Scott Kennedy, “Made in China 2025”, Critical Questions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 June 2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025.
- Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree, “The Rise of China in Technology Standards: New Norms in Old Institutions”, Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 16 January 2013, 4, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/RiseofChinainTechnologyStandards.pdf.
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- “China Wins Indonesia High-speed Rail Project as Japan Laments ‘Extremely Regrettable’ U-turn”, South China Morning Post, 29 September 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/1862459/china-wins-indonesia-high-speed-rail-project-japan-laments.
- [High-speed Rail Export Scores Historical Breakthrough, China and Indonesia Will Jointly Build High Speed Rail between Jakarta and Bandung]”, 17 October 2015, Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-10/17/c_128327911.htm.
- [Using Development Finance to Serve the OBOR Strategy]”, China Banking, 13 January 2016, http://www.cdb.com.cn/rdzt/gjyw_1/201601/t20160118_2187.html.
- World Steel Association data, accessed 8 August 2016, https://www.worldsteel.org/dms/internetDocumentList/statistics-archive/production-archive/steel-archive/steel-monthly/Steel-monthly-2015/document/Steel%20monthly%202015.pdf.
- [Li Keqiang Knocking on the Door of ASEAN Countries and Industrial Capacity Cooperation is the Key]”, Chinese Government Information Portal, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-11/19/content_5014521.htm.
- Peter Cai, “Curbs on Coal and Steel will Test Beijing’s Resolve”, The Australian, 19 January 2016, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/business-spectator/curbs-on-coal-and-steel-will-test-beijings-resolve/news-story/43dfa1b17bd88556d1b8746e0c7d2658.
- Li Keqiang’s Official Speech at the 17th ASEAN–China (10+1) Leaders’ Meeting, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 13 November 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/ydyl_675049/zyxw_675051/t1210820.shtml.
- [Using Development Finance to Service the One Belt and One Road Strategy]”, first published in China Banking Industry Magazine, 13 January 2016, http://www.cdb.com.cn/rdzt/gjyw_1/201601/t20160118_2187.html.
- Jin Qi’s speech in Hong Kong on 18 May 2016 at Belt and Road Summit, http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/cnweb/19930/19938/32726/index.html.
- [Xi Jinping’s Speech at the One Belt and One Road Work Conference, Chaired by Zhang Gaoli]”, Xinhua News Agency, 17 August 2016, http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2016-08/17/content_5100177.htm.
- Tanvi Madan, “What India Thinks about China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (But Does Not Explicitly Say)”, Order from Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, 14 March 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/14/what-india-thinks-about-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-but-doesnt-explicitly-say/.
- Kamran Haider and Ismail Dilawar, “Militants Strike Pakistan, Hitting China’s Economic Corridor”, Bloomberg, 26 October 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-25/militants-return-to-pakistan-hitting-china-s-economic-corridor.
- [China Development Bank Builds One Belt One Road Project Bank and the Total Amount is Approaching One Trillion USD]”, Caijing, 28 May 2015, http://m.caijing.com.cn/api/show?contentid=3893051.
- [“New Overseas Investment Landscape against the Backdrop of One Belt and One Road Strategy”, in Leading Scholars from National Think Tanks and Their Insights on China’s New Silk Road] (Beijing: CITIC Press, 2015), 138, 285.
- “Thailand Rebuffs Railway Deal with China”, The Straits Times, 5 May 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailand-rebuffs-railway-deal-with-china.


